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Justice Ginsburg’s Fiduciary Loophole: A Viable 
Achilles’ Heel to HMOs’ Impenetrable ERISA Shield 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although at first Juan Davila only felt weak, he was later rushed 
to the emergency room to find severe internal bleeding that nearly 
took his life. With seven units of blood, five days in critical care, and 
a subsequent hospital stay, he barely cheated death, but not un-
scathed.1 Previously, his health maintenance organization (HMO), 
Aetna, had refused to cover Vioxx—the medication recommended 
by his physician to treat his rheumatoid arthritis—and instead only 
consented to cover Naproxen, a less expensive pain killer.2 With nei-
ther the time nor the means to appeal Aetna’s decision, Davila opted 
to accept the covered treatment.3 As a result of his HMO’s coverage 
decision of what it considered a “medical necessity,” Davila barely 
escaped impending death and was left in a state in which he could no 
longer take any oral medication, including Vioxx.4 
Sadly enough, Juan Davila is just one tragic example of many 
Americans who have suffered from poor HMO decisions or delays.5 
What is almost equally tragic is that legally the courts’ hands are tied 
from providing compensatory relief to patients injured from HMOs’ 
decisions, such as denying coverage of doctor-prescribed treatments. 
Under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), courts cannot provide compensatory relief for victims like 
Juan Davila—or so courts have interpreted ERISA historically.6 
In reality, the U.S. Supreme Court has inadvertently painted it-
self into a corner by restrictively interpreting ERISA to preclude 
 
 1. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Aetna Health 
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Brief for Respondents at 7, Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83). 
 5. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 83 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated, Vytra Healthcare v. 
Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (delaying a plaintiff’s cancer treatment resulting in the plaintiff’s 
demise due to disagreement between the plaintiff’s treating physician and his HMO as to 
whether a blood stem cell transplant was too experimental); Roark, 307 F.3d at 303–04 (refus-
ing to cover treatments of the plaintiff’s spider bite wound resulted in double amputations). 
 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). 
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compensatory relief to victims of HMO patient treatment decisions, 
which is duly incompatible with issues like HMO liability for em-
ployer-based HMO plans. Congress intended ERISA to provide na-
tional uniformity in administration of employee benefit plans.7 To 
this end, ERISA expressly provides that any claims related to an em-
ployer plan under state laws are preempted by ERISA.8 But at the 
time of ERISA’s creation, employer-based HMOs were not prevalent 
in the health care system. And because ERISA was created before the 
rise of HMOs, Congress could not anticipate the extent to which 
ERISA would affect HMO liability. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the statutory language of ERISA to indicate that Congress in-
tended to only provide traditional equitable relief, such as injunction 
or restitution, for claims brought against ERISA plans.9 What this 
means, in part, is that persons injured due to delay or denial of bene-
fit coverage cannot receive compensatory relief from their HMO. In 
effect, the law initially enacted to protect plan participants is thus 
turned against them in the HMO context. 
Consequently, injured participants are left with few options. 
With no compensatory damages available under ERISA, a natural re-
action for plaintiffs would be to make claims under different state 
laws. However, ERISA also preempts any claim related to ERISA 
plans.10 Hence, plaintiffs still receive no compensation. Crafty lawyers 
have attempted—with limited success—to circumvent the ERISA 
barrier in other ways. For instance, ERISA itself contains a safe har-
bor called the Savings Clause, which allows state law claims to avoid 
ERISA preemption if the claims relate to the “business of insur-
ance.”11 However, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the 
Savings Clause to only allow exemption from preemption if the state 
law claimed does not replace, or in other words, conflict with what is 
covered by ERISA’s remedial scheme as contained in § 502.12 In a 
few situations, other state claims against HMOs have circumvented 
 
 7. See id. § 1001(a). 
 8. Id. § 1144(a). 
 9. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58, 262–63 (1993). 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 11. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see, e.g., Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 
329, 336 (2003). 
 12. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375–76 (2002) (stating 
that there are few civil enforcement exemptions from ERISA’s federal preemption). 
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ERISA preemption, such as corporate negligence,13 bad faith,14 vi-
carious liability,15 and even federal RICO claims.16 
Recently, however, in a concurring opinion of the Aetna Health 
Inc. v. Davila decision, Justice Ginsburg referred to an argument in 
the Government’s amicus brief mentioning a specific uncharted area 
of the law that may potentially provide monetary relief to ERISA 
plan members.17 She pointed out that the Supreme Court had not 
yet precluded make-whole relief under a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim.18 
In related cases, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, based his 
decision solely on specific statutory language, interpreting ERISA’s 
remedial scheme to protect only ERISA plans and to preclude indi-
vidual relief for breach of fiduciary duty.19 Naturally, with such an ex-
treme action from the textualist side of the Court, one can expect an 
(nearly) equal and opposite reaction from the purposivist side of the 
Court. And so it came; Justice Stevens’s dissent countered the major-
ity with a more employee-friendly alternative approach based on 
common law trust principles that would award individual compensa-
tory relief under ERISA for breaches of fiduciary duty.20 Indeed, it is 
difficult to predict which side will prevail when the issue of ERISA 
damages based on a claim of HMO breach of fiduciary duty finally is 
 
 13. See, e.g., CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Pybas, 127 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. 
App. 2004) (awarding damages to the respondent/plaintiff for corporate negligence). 
 14. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding ERISA preempts insureds’ bad faith claims). 
 15. See, e.g., Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 848–49 
(Fla. 2003) (holding that a state law wrongful death claim, based on vicarious liability against 
an HMO for medical malpractice of its physicians, is not preempted by ERISA because it does 
not “relate to” ERISA plan administration). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla. 
2002) (finding the plaintiff’s RICO claims reverse-preempted by particular state law that does 
not allow civil damages). Emotional distress claims did not survive. See, e.g., Palmer v. Superior 
Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 266–67 (Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that an HMO’s decision to 
use medical utilization review was not an administrative decision but a medical clinical judg-
ment). 
 17. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27–28 & n.13, 
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58, 262–63 (1993); see also Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209–10 (2002). 
 20. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting); see also Great-West, 534 U.S. at 
225–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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squarely before the Supreme Court. One may question if perhaps 
this is the long-awaited claim for relief—the light at the end of the 
tunnel—that will finally survive under ERISA. That depends on a 
delicate balance between textualists and purposivists that exists 
among the Supreme Court Justices. 
This Comment discusses how Justice Ginsburg’s fiduciary 
“loophole”—specifically, damages claimed for the breach of fiduciary 
duty under ERISA in the context of HMOs—may fare before the 
Supreme Court in light of the delicate balance that exists among Su-
preme Court Justices. This Comment argues that Justice Ginsburg’s 
loophole should be in fact a viable Achilles’ heel to HMOs’ impene-
trable ERISA shield. The drafters of ERISA’s remedial scheme in-
tended the courts to derive its interpretation from its more readily 
apparent context and the purpose of the statute, as Justice Stevens 
has suggested, rather than encrypting it in outmoded terminology, as 
Justice Scalia has reasoned. Under this interpretation, Congress ob-
viously intended to provide compensatory relief to those injured 
ERISA plan members. As the issue now stands, Justice Ginsburg 
emphasizes that there is a “rising judicial chorus urging that Con-
gress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tan-
gled ERISA regime.”21 Furthermore, as HMO liability is really an is-
sue more far reaching than ERISA is designed to cover, this 
Comment argues that HMO liability truly deserves closer congres-
sional attention. 
Part II of this Comment provides a background of ERISA and its 
troubling application in HMO liability. Part III describes the signifi-
cant case history, in which Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens clashed 
on the issue of what sort of remedies ERISA provides. Part IV con-
trasts the overarching viewpoints of Scalia and Stevens. Finally, par-
ticularly in light of the Court’s two opposing approaches toward 
ERISA remedies, Part V implicates how Justice Ginsburg’s fiduciary 
loophole should be the proper interpretation. 
 
 21. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 222 (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 
442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)). 
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II. ERISA BACKGROUND 
ERISA first made its way into the congressional limelight with 
the closing of the Studebaker South Bend, Indiana factory in 1963.22 
Studebaker defaulted on pension payments because its pension plan 
was not adequately funded to compensate all of its vested pension 
obligations.23 This event catalyzed long-awaited congressional action 
in pension reform.24 Assistant Secretary Thomas R. Donahue de-
picted Studebaker’s tangled plight before Congress as follows: 
In all too many cases the pension promise shrinks to this: “If you 
remain in good health and stay with the same company until you 
are 65 years old, and if the company is still in business, and if your 
department has not been abolished, and if you haven’t been laid off 
for too long a period, and if there is enough money in the fund, 
and if that money has been prudently managed, you will get a pen-
sion.”25 
As a result of the flaws in pension systems, United Auto Workers 
(UAW) labor union proposed legislative reform.26 UAW officials, for 
example, proposed legislation to protect employee benefits from de-
fault risk by creating a pension reinsurance.27 This marked the begin-
ning of a series of employee benefit reforms that compose ERISA, 
which was enacted in 1974.28 
Congress wanted to create a comprehensive scheme to regulate 
employee benefit plans—both pension plans and welfare plans.29 
ERISA was intended to provide uniform regulation of employee 
benefit plans30 and “to protect . . . the interests of [plan] participants 
. . . by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready ac-
 
 22. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Stude-
baker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 726 (2001). 
 23. Id. at 683–84. 
 24. Id. at 684. 
 25. Pension and Welfare Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on 
Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 217 (1968) (statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Assistant 
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Services, Department of Labor). 
 26. Wooten, supra note 22, at 684. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See generally DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining the need for ERISA). 
 30. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). 
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cess to the Federal courts.”31 In general, ERISA’s provisions ensure 
(1) adequate funding of pension plans, (2) vesting of benefits for 
plan participants, and (3) fiduciary obligations for plan admin-
istrators, arguably based in trust law, as will be explained later.32 
Because ERISA is a lengthy statute, the following sections will 
explore only those portions that seem most relevant to the issue of 
individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty in the HMO context. 
Section A will give a brief overview of HMOs and how they relate to 
ERISA. Section B will explain the civil remedies provided for in 
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Section C will describe how the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of § 502(a)(1)(B) has limited the availability 
of ERISA civil remedies. Last, Section D will discuss how the 
Court’s overly-narrow interpretation has created a “regulatory vac-
uum” of remedies for plaintiffs. 
A. HMO Background in ERISA Context 
Before delving further into an analysis of ERISA civil remedies 
against HMOs for breach of fiduciary duty, it is helpful to first un-
derstand how HMOs fit into the ERISA context. In the thirty years 
since ERISA was enacted, the health care industry has changed dra-
matically. Managed care systems, such as HMOs, did not exist as the 
massive, industry-dominating giants we know today. At the time of 
ERISA’s enactment, physicians billed insurers after treating patients 
in a fee-for-service program, whereupon insurers made retrospective 
coverage decisions.33 If insurers denied coverage for treatments, pa-
tients could seek benefits due under ERISA § 502(a).34 Today, how-
ever, managed care employee-benefit plans are more prevalent 
among the American workforce, with three out of four workers hav-
ing this type of plan.35 In contrast to the fee-for-service practice in 
the past, HMOs now determine treatment coverage prospectively as 
 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000). 
 32. Pamela D. Perdue, Overview of ERISA’s Legislative and Regulatory Scheme, SJ068 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 5 (2004); see Davila, 542 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Su-
preme Court needs to . . . realign ERISA remedy law with the trust remedial tradition that 
Congress intended [when it provided in § 502(a)(3) for] ‘appropriate equitable relief.’” (quot-
ing John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error 
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003))). 
 33. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000). 
 34. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 464. 
 35. Id. 
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a cost-saving measure, based on a utilization review board’s determi-
nation of “medical necessity” before any treatment takes place.36 
Unfortunately, under today’s HMO coverage system, a wrongful 
delay or denial of coverage can cause injurious, even tragic, conse-
quences. Quite often, the HMO’s coverage decision in a medical 
emergency “de facto determines a patient’s actual treatment along 
with his eligibility for benefits . . . .”37 Because of the time and in-
convenience involved in appealing coverage denial, most patients in 
urgent circumstances do not attempt to appeal the denial of cover-
age.38 Instead, they opt in haste to pay out of pocket, to forego the 
treatment, or to use a less expensive treatment.39 As will be discussed 
later, ERISA does not permit compensatory damages according to 
the Supreme Court majority—a tragedy for a plan participant who is 
injured from an HMO’s negligence.40 
One of the primary purposes of ERISA is to enforce the fiduciary 
duties of plan administrators.41 A fiduciary under ERISA is any per-
son “[who] has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsi-
bility in the administration of [an employee benefit] plan.”42 There-
fore, HMOs are generally regarded as plan fiduciaries when they use 
their discretion, as part of their plan administrative duties, to make 
eligibility decisions for plan benefits,43 though that distinction is not 
always clear.44 Once a court determines that an HMO is acting as a 
fiduciary, it may then determine what relief is available under ERISA 
for an HMO’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
Most claims against HMOs were typically brought under state 
law claims to avoid ERISA’s strict remedial scheme. Consequently, 
Congress included a preemption provision that supersedes most state 
laws relating to employee benefit plans to maintain uniformity in 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993). 
 41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 224 
(2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Langbein, supra note 32, at 1319). 
 42. ERISA § 3(21)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (2000). 
 43. Id.; Davila, 542 U.S. at 219. 
 44. See infra Part III.A. 
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regulation of employee benefit plans.45 Therefore, plan participants 
are limited to seeking a remedy under § 502(a). 
B. Section 502(a)(1)(B) Civil Enforcement Provisions 
In terms of HMO liability for breach of fiduciary duty, the 
remedies provided in the ERISA Civil Enforcement Provisions, as 
contained in § 502, are the source of much of the debate. ERISA  
§ 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may 
bring civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of 
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clar-
ify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”46 Addi-
tionally, § 502(a)(2) allows plan participants, beneficiaries, or fiduci-
aries to bring a civil action “for appropriate relief under [§ 409] of 
this title.”47 Section 502(a)(3) allows them to bring civil action “(A) 
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate 
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any 
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”48 
The central debate concerning the scope of ERISA Civil En-
forcement Provisions stems from the judicial interpretation of “ap-
propriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3). The Supreme Court, un-
der Justice Scalia, feared that the phrase could potentially cover all 
types of relief, “render[ing] the modifier [‘equitable’] superfluous.”49 
Therefore, in the landmark Mertens v. Hewitt Associates decision, the 
Court limited the scope of “appropriate equitable relief” to “those 
categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as in-
junction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory dam-
 
 45. Alden J. Bianchi, ERISA and Health Plans: Selected Court Decisions—Focus on 
ERISA Preemption Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller, Davila v. Aetna, Hawaii 
Management Alliance Association v. Insurance Commissioner, SK064 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1035, 
1037, 1042 (2005); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1144(a). 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
 47. Id. § 1132(a)(2); see id. § 1109(a) (“Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a 
plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries 
by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan 
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which 
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such 
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of 
such fiduciary.”). 
 48. Id. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
 49. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993). 
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ages).”50 Prior to limiting the scope of civil remedies available within 
ERISA in Mertens, the Court limited the availability of civil remedies 
outside of ERISA in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.51 
C. Section 502(a) Exclusive List of Remedies: 
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux 
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that ERISA was intended to provide a “comprehensive civil en-
forcement scheme.”52 In other words, plaintiffs are limited to the 
remedies expressly provided for in the “plain” language of ERISA it-
self.53 Indeed, according to the Court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. 
Dedeaux, plan participants would undermine the policy reasons 
Congress adopted when it selected the provisions contained in  
§ 502(a), such as uniformity in plan administration, if they “were 
free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in 
ERISA.”54 Thus, “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, sup-
plements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts 
with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclu-
sive” and is preempted by the provisions in § 502(a).55 For better or 
for worse, plaintiffs are stuck with ERISA’s exclusive remedial 
scheme. 
D. Regulatory Vacuum 
In essence, Justice Scalia’s narrow scope of remedies combined 
with ERISA’s preemption clause has left most injured ERISA plan 
participants empty-handed, without remedy against their HMO, in 
what has been termed a “regulatory vacuum.”56 ERISA’s broad pre-
 
 50. Id. at 256, 262–63. 
 51. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004). ERISA’s “carefully inte-
grated civil enforcement provisions . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend 
to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.” Pilot Life Ins. Co., 
481 U.S. at 54 (quoting Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 
(1985)). 
 56. Kelly M. Loud, Note, ERISA Preemption and Patients’ Rights in the Wake of Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1061 (2005) (quoting Davila, 542 U.S. at 
222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
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emptive power strips the plaintiff of state remedies.57 Yet, ERISA’s 
“comprehensive and reticulated” scheme fails to replace them with 
appropriate federal remedies for a plaintiff physically injured due to 
delay or denial of medical treatment coverage.58 The Court has made 
it abundantly clear that there is no compensatory relief available un-
der ERISA for consequential injury.59 If the most an HMO would 
have to provide as an ERISA remedy would be an injunction or the 
cost of the denied treatment, it stands to reason that an HMO would 
seek ERISA preemption.60 In most cases, unless the plaintiff seeks a 
preliminary injunction or reimbursement for denied treatment that 
he or she has already paid for out-of-pocket, the plaintiff, being un-
able to recover for resulting injuries, is simply out of luck, while the 
HMO incurs no liability for the injury.61 Under ERISA’s liability 
shield, there seems to be little that can stop HMOs from inducing 
unbridled harm to ERISA plan members.62 
Thus, perhaps the Court, in its strict textualist approach for con-
sistency, has lost sight of ERISA’s mission to protect the interests of 
plan participants. Indeed, the Court indicated that the ERISA draft-
ers “were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, 
and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than 
with the rights of the individual beneficiary.”63 
Furthermore, ERISA participants’ desperate attempts to circum-
vent ERISA’s remedial scheme have been met with little success in 
the courts—those claims that do succeed tend to be the exception 
 
 57. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54. 
 58. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251, 254 (1993) (quoting Nachman 
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). 
 59. Id. at 256–58, 262–63. 
 60. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000); see also Allen D. Allred & Don L. Daniel, Upon 
Further Review: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care Or-
ganization Liability, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309, 314 (2003). 
 61. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 211. 
 62. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453–54 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“However, with the rise of managed care and the Supreme Court’s series of decisions holding 
preempted any action for damages against HMOs, ERISA has evolved into a shield that insu-
lates HMOs from liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against 
plan beneficiaries, a state of affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress. 
Indeed, existing ERISA jurisprudence creates a monetary incentive for HMOs to mistreat 
those beneficiaries, who are often in the throes of medical crises and entirely unable to assert 
what meager rights they possess.”). 
 63. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985). 
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rather than the rule.64 Instead of trying to get around ERISA pre-
emption, Justice Ginsburg’s unique approach to this dilemma actu-
ally embraces ERISA’s remedial scheme. In her concurrence in the 
recent Davila decision, she proposed the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim as a potential source of relief available under  
§ 502(a)(3), which provides for “other appropriate equitable re-
lief.”65 Though the Court has not yet ruled on this exact issue in the 
HMO context, Part III introduces a series of cases that illustrate the 
tug-of-war within the Court for the “appropriate” scope of § 
502(a)(3). 
III. “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” REVEALED 
A. ERISA § 502(a)(3): Outside of the Realm of HMOs 
1. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell 
Beginning with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Rus-
sell in 1985, a sharp division arose in the Court as to the scope of 
“equitable” relief available to individual ERISA plan beneficiaries.66 
The plaintiff in Russell sought compensation for her disability plan’s 
wrongful denial of benefits.67 The majority decision, authored by 
Justice Stevens, ruled against individual relief under §§ 409(a) and 
502(a)(2), which allowed relief only to the plan for breach of fiduci-
ary duty.68 What is more, Justice Stevens read ERISA as so “compre-
hensive and reticulated” that the Court is precluded from inferring 
other remedies not expressly included in the statute because Con-
 
 64. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that ERISA preempts insureds’ bad faith claims); In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F. 
Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Palmer v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252 (Ct. App. 
2002); Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2003) (holding 
that a state law wrongful death claim, based on vicarious liability against an HMO for medical 
malpractice of its physicians, is not preempted by ERISA because it does not “relate to” ERISA 
plan administration); CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Pybas, 127 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App. 
2004). 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000); Davila, 542 U.S. at 224. 
 66. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
 67. Id. at 136–37. 
 68. Id. at 142–43, 145–48. 
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gress had actually intended to omit them.69 Taking it one step fur-
ther, Justice Scalia extended this theory to § 502(a)(3) relief in his 
decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates70 and Great-West Life and 
Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.71 As explained in more detail be-
low, it was Justice Stevens’s opinion in Russell that seemed to later 
spark Justice Scalia’s restrictive Mertens opinion.72 
The Russell concurrence by Justice Brennan was quick to catch 
Justice Stevens’s assumed misstatement: that ERISA is a “compre-
hensive and reticulated statute.”73 According to Brennan, ERISA’s 
legislative history demonstrates that Congress rather intended 
ERISA to provide a general skeletal scheme that was to be further 
developed by case law.74 
2. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates 
Gleaning from Justice Stevens’s dicta in Russell, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Mertens took an awkwardly narrow approach to “equita-
ble” relief. In Mertens, the plaintiff was unable to recover all of his 
accrued benefits from either his insolvent employer or the ERISA 
plan’s termination insurance program.75 The plaintiff sought com-
pensatory damages against an actuarial firm for its involvement with 
the employer’s plan accounts and for the firm’s failure to reveal that 
the accounts were under-funded.76 The Court held that because 
Congress intended ERISA to be an all-inclusive legal package, ac-
cording to Russell, “equitable” relief in § 502(a)(3) against a non-
fiduciary must not include the application of outside trust law.77 The 
Court reasoned that “‘[e]quitable’ relief must mean something less 
than all relief.”78 Instead, it must only refer to those remedies typi-
 
 69. Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 
(1980)). 
 70. 508 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1993). 
 71. 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002). 
 72. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., concurring). This decision was joined by 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall. 
 74. See id. at 152 n.6, 155–57 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also infra note 266 and 
accompanying text. Justice Brennan’s appeal to legislative history will be highlighted in greater 
detail in Part IV of this Comment. 
 75. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 251, 261–63. 
 78. Id. at 258 n.8. 
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cally available in equity from the days of the divided bench.79 Those 
remedies included injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but ex-
pressly excluded compensatory damages.80 
In a surprising about-face of loyalty from the strict textualist 
Scalia camp to the more purposivist side, Justice Stevens switched 
from his majority opinion in Russell against individual compensatory 
relief under § 502(a)(2) to the dissent approach in Mertens, favoring 
individual compensatory relief under § 502(a)(3).81 He, along with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, joined Justice 
White’s dissent.82 The dissent argued that monetary compensatory 
damages to “make the victims [of the breach] whole” are an accept-
able form of equitable relief traditionally awarded in trust common 
law.83 Thus, according to the dissent, the majority under Justice 
Scalia was mistaken in precluding all forms of compensatory dam-
ages.84 
3. Varity Corp. v. Howe 
Just when it seemed there was no hope for any kind of practic-
able relief for injured individual ERISA plan participants, hope finally 
came in the Varity Corp. v. Howe decision of 1996, in which the Su-
preme Court purposivist camp finally prevailed and thereby pro-
vided individual compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duties to 
plan participants.85 In Varity, the plan fiduciaries purposefully misled 
the employees under the plan.86 The Court distinguished Russell, 
holding that even though individual relief for breach of fiduciary 
duty is not available under §§ 409(a) and 502(a)(2), it is available 
under § 502(a)(3).87 According to the majority, there was no reason 
why Congress would have denied relief under those circumstances.88 
 
 79. Id. at 256–57. 
 80. Id. at 256. 
 81. Id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 
134–35 (1985). 
 82. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 266–67. 
 84. Id. at 263–64. 
 85. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
 86. Id. at 494. 
 87. Id. at 515. 
 88. Id. at 513. 
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Naturally, the textualist camp contended this result.89 Justice 
Thomas’s lengthy dissent reiterated a strict, confined statutory con-
struction—arguing in true textualist style against any remedy not ex-
pressly included in the statute.90 It maintained that Russell should 
also apply to § 502(a)(3), especially since ERISA was not intended 
to follow the trust common law definition of fiduciary duty to pro-
tect plan participants, but to protect the integrity of the plan itself.91 
In short, there should be no recovery for breach of fiduciary duty 
under § 502(a)(3).92 
4. Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson 
Lastly, in 2002, the pendulum swung back in favor of the textu-
alist side in Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,93 
in which Justice Scalia supported the majority’s earlier Mertens deci-
sion. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., the plaintiff in this 
case, sought subrogation for insurance benefits it paid a plan benefi-
ciary who later received compensatory relief from the third party 
tortfeasor.94 Again, the majority under Justice Scalia reiterated the 
same narrow interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” used in 
Mertens95—those “typically available in equity”96—due to the com-
prehensive nature of ERISA’s construction.97 The Court ruled that a 
plaintiff could not hold a defendant personally liable for restitution 
in equity but could only recover the plaintiff’s particular identifiable 
property in the defendant’s possession.98 However, the Court held 
against recovery for the ERISA plan because the settlement funds 
were not in the defendant’s possession.99 
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority’s decision. He 
pointed out that Mertens applied only to § 502(a)(3)(B) for “other 
 
 89. See id. at 516 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This dissent was joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Scalia. 
 90. Id. at 516–22. 
 91. Id. at 522–25. 
 92. Id. at 516. 
 93. 534 U.S. 204, 209–10 (2002). 
 94. Id. at 208. 
 95. Id. at 209 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994)). 
 96. Id. at 210 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)). 
 97. Id. at 209–10. 
 98. Id. at 213–14. 
 99. Id. at 214. 
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appropriate equitable relief”—not to the instant case seeking injunc-
tion under § 502(a)(3)(A).100 Essentially, he saw no reason why 
Congress would create a cause of action and not provide a remedy 
for plan participants.101 So, according to Justice Stevens, it would 
stand to reason that the majority had no basis for insisting that Con-
gress intended to preclude compensatory remedies to plan partici-
pants, other than its historical analysis of an obsolete court system.102 
Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. First, reflecting Justice Stevens’s 
separate comments, Justice Ginsburg blasted the majority for relying 
on an unjustifiable definition of “equitable” relief that not only had 
been abandoned since the 1930s but also contradicted “Congress’ 
stated goals in enacting ERISA.”103 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent sup-
ported a flexible definition of equitable relief, based in trust law, 
adaptable to provide the “appropriate . . . equitable relief in each 
case.”104 
Also, it is worth noting some critical flaws in Justice Scalia’s posi-
tion in Great-West on § 502(a)(3) restitution, as pointed out by Pro-
fessor John H. Langbein—an author whose article is widely recog-
nized on the issue, notably by Justice Ginsburg in her Davila 
concurrence.105 First, Justice Scalia had to amend his views of restitu-
tion as an appropriate form of relief in order to maintain his position 
against monetary damages.106 Accordingly, he distinguished restitu-
tion in law and in equity.107 The plaintiff could not impose personal 
liability on the defendant, as such would constitute restitution in 
law.108 Yet, had Justice Scalia paid more attention to the same text he 
relied on to revive the antiquated definition of “equity” in Mertens, 
he would have found that the plan, as the “equitable assignee” in 
subrogation cases, should have a right to restitution of repaid funds 
in equity.109 Another significant problem lies in the fact that neither 
 
 100. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 223. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 225–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 230 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (1994)). 
 105. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 224 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring) (citing Langbein, supra note 32, at 1319). 
 106. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1357. 
 107. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210–12. 
 108. Id. at 214. 
 109. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1358. 
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restitution nor mandamus existed in equity before the divided bench, 
only quasi-contract and constructive trusts did.110 This brings into 
question the validity of Justice Scalia’s Mertens opinion, which origi-
nally included restitution as a form of relief “typically available in eq-
uity.”111 Also, Justice Scalia’s inflexible interpretation would permit 
plan beneficiaries, such as the defendant in Mertens, to use ERISA as 
an “instrument of fraud” against their plan.112 These are some seri-
ous flaws that call Justice Scalia’s whole logic into question. 
Thus, we see from the Court’s complicated history that the fu-
ture of individual compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duty 
under § 502(a)(3) is nearly impossible to predict. On the one end of 
the tug-of-war is Justice Scalia’s textualist camp, insisting on a lim-
ited interpretation of § 502(a)(3) that leaves most injured ERISA 
plan participants without compensatory relief. On the other end is 
Justice Stevens’s purposivist camp, relying on common law trust 
principles to provide a broader, make-whole standard for compens-
atory relief under § 502(a)(3). And more recently, the replacements 
of two swing voters on this issue—former Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor—could tip the scales in either direction. 
With that background of the Court’s general approach to 
§502(a)(3) jurisprudence, the Pegram case, laid out below, illustrates 
in particular the Court’s approach to HMOs under ERISA’s reme-
dial scheme. 
B. Plugging HMO Breach of Fiduciary Duty into the  
ERISA § 502(a)(3) Equation  
1. Pegram v. Herdrich: Davila Precursor 
Pegram v. Herdrich113 was a noteworthy precursor in 2000 that 
helped set the stage for the Davila decision. Like Davila, this case 
concerned HMO liability for the treatment of its employee plan par-
ticipants. The HMO in this case, Carle Care, was owned by physi-
cians that provided prepaid medical care under employer contracts.114 
Dr. Pegram required Ms. Herdrich to wait eight days to have an ul-
 
 110. Id. at 1357. 
 111. Id.; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
 112. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1358. 
 113. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 114. Id. at 215. 
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trasound of her abdomen.115 It was during this delay that her appen-
dix burst, resulting in peritonitis.116 Accordingly, Ms. Herdrich 
originally filed state claims for medical malpractice and for fraud. 
When defendants removed the case to federal court under ERISA 
preemption, she amended her complaint to include a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. 
In order to determine Carle’s liability for a breach of fiduciary 
duty under ERISA, the Supreme Court had to consider whether 
treatment decisions made by HMO physician employees of an 
ERISA-regulated plan constituted fiduciary acts.117 The “threshold 
question” for ERISA breach of fiduciary duty was “not whether the 
actions of some person employed to provide services under a plan 
adversely affected a plan beneficiary’s interest, but whether that per-
son was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was performing a fiduciary func-
tion) when taking the action subject to complaint.”118 An ERISA 
plan administrator may wear many hats, but he or she must wear 
only one hat at a time, meaning the administrator is a fiduciary for 
the purposes of ERISA only when he or she acts in that capacity.119 
Indeed, to argue the existence of injury before the existence of a 
duty would put the cart before the horse. 
The Court distinguished this case, where Carle’s physicians made 
mixed treatment and eligibility decisions, from situations involving 
pure eligibility decisions.120 According to the Court, pure eligibility 
decisions were strictly administrative actions—clearly part of ERISA 
fiduciary duty.121 But mixed treatment and eligibility decisions were 
not fiduciary decisions.122 
One of the Court’s primary concerns with mixed eligibility deci-
sions was the troublesome task of separating pure eligibility decisions 
from treatment decisions and the impact that may have on claims.123 
Most HMO plans require a determination of “medical necessity” for 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. Peritonitis is in general an inflammation of the abdominal cavity. 
 117. Id. at 214. 
 118. Id. at 226. 
 119. Id. at 225. 
 120. Id. at 228–29. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 229. 
 123. Id. at 228. 
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coverage eligibility.124 The opinion of the treating physician generally 
holds great weight in the determination of “medical necessity.”125 In 
mixed decisions, however, the employee physician is making both 
kinds of decisions: “medical necessity” and coverage.126 To further 
complicate the matter, quite often the physician is not deciding 
whether to cover a condition, but when and how to treat the condi-
tion so as to constitute a covered “medical necessity.”127 The Court 
reasoned that an HMO could possibly claim medical judgment in 
defense of its eligibility decision.128 In addition, the Court pointed 
out that participants may also cloak their medical malpractice cases as 
ERISA fiduciary duty claims to access HMOs’ deeper pockets, in ad-
dition to the claims against the physician.129 Or, in the alternative, 
HMOs may use this same tool to successfully remove cases to federal 
courts—a more agreeable jurisdiction for them, as explained ear-
lier.130 
Hence, the Court believed that to allow ERISA preemption of 
mixed eligibility decisions would erode the distinction between state 
malpractice and federal ERISA actions.131 Such an allowance would 
render any medical malpractice claims of HMO physicians in state 
court superfluous,132 no doubt clogging the federal courts with liti-
gation. As a result, federal judges would have to integrate local 
medical malpractice standards into federal ERISA fiduciary cases if 
mixed decisions were considered fiduciary acts.133 Obviously, the 
Court explained, Congress did not intend ERISA to have such far-
reaching ramifications.134 Therefore, the Court unanimously con-
cluded that mixed decisions were not fiduciary actions.135 Because 
the physician’s decision in this case did not constitute a fiduciary act, 
 
 124. Id. at 229. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 228–29. 
 128. Id. at 235. 
 129. Id. at 235–36. It may also be used as a mechanism to collect attorneys’ fees. Id.; see 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2000). 
 130. See supra Part II.D. 
 131. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 450 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 
235–36). 
 132. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235. 
 133. Id. at 236. 
 134. Id. at 237. 
 135. Id. 
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there was no need to determine whether there had been a breach of 
fiduciary duty.136 
2. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila: On the Brink of Defining Remedies  
Finally, in 2004 the Davila case presented the Court with claims 
for breaches of fiduciary duty against HMOs. In Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila,137 the U.S. Supreme Court combined two ERISA preemp-
tion cases. In one case, described at the beginning of this paper, 
Aetna’s denial of coverage for Vioxx pain medication compelled Juan 
Davila to resort to a less expensive pain medication that Aetna would 
cover—a decision that led to severe intestinal bleeding and dam-
age.138 The other respondent, Ruby Calad, suffered complications 
when CIGNA cut short her post-surgery hospital stay—a decision 
that resulted in rehospitalization.139 Both respondents alleged in state 
court that denial of coverage for recommended treatment consti-
tuted a breach of ordinary care in making treatment decisions under 
the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA) and was the proxi-
mate cause of their injuries.140 
The HMO petitioners successfully removed the cases to federal 
court under an ERISA § 502(a) preemption theory.141 On appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit held that the claims were not preempted because 
they were seeking tort damages, not benefit reimbursement.142 
Complete preemption occurs when state causes of action duplicate 
those contained in ERISA § 502(a).143 Since THCLA does not pro-
vide for benefit reimbursement, it does not “duplicate the causes of 
action listed in ERISA.”144 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
case should not be preempted.145 
Reversing the circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court held 
that ERISA completely preempts the THCLA claim for breach of 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
 138. Id. at 205; see also Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 139. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 206. 
 143. Id. (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375–77 (2002)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. 
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ordinary care.146 Since the respondents’ coverage denial claims were 
merely in regard to the administration of their benefits, their claims 
fell within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) fiduciary duties.147 
Moreover, the Court reasoned that permitting state law to supple-
ment § 502(a) remedies would undermine congressional intent that 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) causes of action remain exclusive.148 
Relying on the Court’s reasoning in Pegram v. Herdrich,149 the 
respondents contended that their cases should not be preempted 
since they did not relate to employee benefits.150 The Court distin-
guished its holding in Pegram from the instant cases. It limited Pe-
gram’s reach to mixed eligibility cases where the treating physician 
also made benefit administration decisions—that is, where the plan 
coverage “eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inex-
tricably mixed.”151 In contrast, the plan administrators in these in-
stant cases were “neither respondents’ treating physicians nor the 
employers of respondents’ treating physicians.”152 Furthermore, the 
respondents only claimed recovery for denial of benefits—a pure eli-
gibility decision.153 Therefore, since pure eligibility decisions are fi-
duciary acts under Pegram, these cases fell under ERISA fiduciary 
regulation154 and should be completely preempted.155 
The Court mentioned the Government’s suggestion that  
§ 502(a)(3) could potentially provide make-whole relief to the re-
spondents.156 Yet, since respondents failed to amend their pleadings 
to include § 502(a), the scope of § 502(a) and the remedies thereby 
available were out of the Court’s reach to decide.157 With no other 
 
 146. Id. at 214. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 216. 
 149. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 150. Davila, 542 U.S. at 218. 
 151. Id. (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229). 
 152. Id. at 221. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 218–19. 
 155. Id. at 214, 221. The Court also held that these state claims are not saved from pre-
emption even if the state law regulating insurance only generally duplicates or supplements 
ERISA § 502(a), rather than exactly duplicating ERISA, because of the overpowering compre-
hensiveness intended with § 502(a). See Davila, 542 U.S. at 216. 
 156. Id. at 221 n.7. 
 157. Id.; see also Scott Rhodes, Note, ERISA Strikes Back: Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila’s 
Use of ERISA To Strike Down the Texas Health Care Liability Act, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 481, 
499 (2005) (citing Davila, 542 U.S. at 221 n.7). 
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issues to address, the cases were remanded for further proceedings, 
but the parties did not pursue the case further.158 And so, the fiduci-
ary loophole for ERISA § 502(a) remedies evaded the Court’s con-
sideration. 
Justice Ginsburg, in her sympathetic concurrence, encouraged 
Congress and the Court to correct ERISA’s “regulatory vacuum,” 
which generally leaves plan participants without relief.159 Moreover, 
she further elaborated on make-whole relief which the Court had 
mentioned might be available under ERISA160—a potential loophole 
to the seemingly hopeless “regulatory vacuum.”161 
The aforementioned cases illustrate the sharp division within the 
Court over the scope of § 502(a)(3) relief. At present, the Supreme 
Court has not yet precluded compensatory damages against an 
ERISA fiduciary. The plaintiffs in the Varity case, which was decided 
in between Mertens and Great-West, were awarded equitable relief 
against a fiduciary in the form of reinstatement, not monetary dam-
ages.162 As the Government pointed out in its amicus brief in Davila, 
both the Mertens and Great-West decisions involved claims against 
non-fiduciaries.163 In addition, the mixed decisions at issue in Pe-
gram were also considered non-fiduciary acts.164 Finally, the Court 
again missed the opportunity to address damages against a fiduciary 
in Davila because the plaintiffs did not pursue any issues beyond 
complete preemption.165 Thus, it remains to be seen whether the 
Court’s textualists or purposivists will allow trust law remedies under 
ERISA § 502(a)(3)—specifically make-whole compensatory relief—
against a breaching HMO fiduciary. 
 
 158. Calad v. CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 388 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 159. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. 
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 160. Id. at 221 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 161. Id. at 223–24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 162. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996). 
 163. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27 n.13, Davila, 
542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 
534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 249 (1993). 
 164. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000). 
 165. Davila, 542 U.S. at 221 n.7. 
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IV. SCALIA V. STEVENS: TEXT OR PURPOSE 
As evidenced by the above line of cases, a nearly-even division 
has emerged among the Justices of the Court, each side staunchly 
advancing its respective interpretation of ERISA § 502(a)(3) relief. 
Claiming to use a strict textual approach, Justice Scalia’s camp sup-
ports a narrow interpretation of “equitable relief” to protect only the 
integrity of the plan itself.166 On the other side, Justice Stevens’s 
camp applies common law trust principles to award a broader range 
of make-whole compensatory damages to individuals, as well as the 
plan.167 But with the delicate balance that already exists within the 
Supreme Court and the recent turnover in justices, this tug-of-war 
between Scalia’s interpretation and Stevens’s interpretation could go 
either way. 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet precluded compensatory 
damages for individual plan beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty, 
the Scalia camp’s unwavering treatment of strictly applying the lan-
guage of § 502(a)(3) suggests it is inevitable. First, the Court set the 
stage to preclude compensatory damages in Russell by expressing its 
reluctance to “tamper” with a “comprehensive and reticulated” en-
forcement scheme so carefully crafted in ERISA.168 The Court fur-
ther expressed that ERISA’s fiduciary liability provision and corre-
sponding enforcement provision were intended to protect the plan as 
a whole, rather than the individual plan beneficiaries.169 
Second, the Scalia camp attributes its § 502(a) interpretation 
generally out of strict allegiance to clear congressional intent. In par-
ticular, as Justice Scalia aptly put it, “It is, however, not our job to 
find reasons for what Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to 
avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done (here, limit the 
available relief) devoid of reason and effect.”170 Indeed, Justice Scalia 
insisted that if Congress had intended to authorize such broad relief 
as the dissent interpreted § 502(a) to provide, it would have simply 
 
 166. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 522–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 
256–57. 
 167. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 266–67 (White, J., dissenting). 
 168. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1985) (quoting Nach-
man Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)); see also Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 147). 
 169. Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. 
 170. Great-West Life Annuity & Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217–18 (2002). 
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said so in the statute.171 Another example of the Court’s blind obedi-
ence to the text of the statute is in part of Justice Stevens’s rationale 
for denying relief to a plan participant for detrimental delay in bene-
fit claims processing—“the text of ERISA does not explicitly regulate 
‘the possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators’ proc-
essing of a disputed claim.’”172 Although Justice Stevens has since 
made an about-face in his views, Justice Scalia was still convinced in 
Mertens that trust law would provide a broader range of remedies 
than Congress intended.173 Hence, Justice Scalia’s side insists that 
Congress intended his narrow construction of ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
Last, and more importantly, the Court’s insistence in Mertens 
that compensatory damages are not “appropriate equitable relief” as 
contained in ERISA § 502 in the non-fiduciary context will likely 
carry over to the fiduciary context.174 In the Great-West opinion, the 
Scalia camp expressly reinforced that it would not vary its interpreta-
tion of § 502 depending on the context by carving out one exclu-
sive, narrow exception—allowing only “restitution traditionally avail-
able in equity,” or non-legal relief.175 In other words, “for restitution 
to lie in equity,” the plaintiff cannot impose personal liability on the 
defendant, as it would be considered legal relief, except to recover 
identifiable money in the defendant’s possession that “in good con-
science” belongs to the plaintiff.176 Interestingly enough, contrary to 
the pattern set by Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer’s Varity opinion indi-
cated that § 502(a)(3) does cover breaches of fiduciary duty.177 
 
 171. Id. at 218. One could also argue the opposite: if Congress had intended such a nar-
row definition of “other appropriate equitable relief” as the majority interpreted ERISA  
§ 502(a) to provide, it would have expressly said so. 
 172. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1328 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 144). 
 173. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257–58 (1993). 
 174. See id. at 256 (limiting the scope of “other appropriate equitable relief” in ERISA  
§ 502(a)(3) to “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunc-
tion, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)”); see also Great-West, 534 
U.S. at 221 (holding that ERISA § 502(a)(3) does not authorize legal relief); Bowen v. Massa-
chusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Almost invariably . . . suits 
seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a 
sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally 
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defen-
dant’s breach of legal duty.”); Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 (holding that ERISA § 409 only au-
thorizes extra-contractual damages to the plan itself, not to plan beneficiaries). And “[m]oney 
damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.” Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255. 
 175. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214. 
 176. Id. at 213–14. 
 177. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 (1996). 
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Justice Thomas weighed in on the issue of “appropriate equitable 
relief” for the Scalia camp. In his dissent to the Varity opinion, he 
“conclude[d] that Congress intended §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) to pro-
vide the exclusive mechanism for bringing claims of breach of fiduci-
ary duty,” indicating rather clearly that he opposed individual relief 
for breach of fiduciary duty.178 And, buried in a footnote at the end 
of the Great-West decision, Justice Scalia clarified Justice Thomas’s 
dissent, emphasizing the limited spectrum of equitable remedies 
available under § 502(a)(3), even in the fiduciary context.179 
Whereby the Scalia camp implied, as some lower courts have rea-
soned, that “the status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or nonfi-
duciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute 
‘appropriate equitable relief’ under § 502(a)(3).”180 Therefore, it 
seems the fiduciary context would likely present a distinction that 
would not make a difference for the Scalia camp in its narrow appli-
cation of § 502(a)(3). 
In contrast, Justice Stevens’s camp would likely include make-
whole remedies under its broad interpretation of “appropriate equi-
table relief” for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty. The first and fore-
most reason is that one of the primary purposes of ERISA, expressly 
written into the text of the statute, was to protect the “interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans.”181 
Second, from the fact that ERISA was originally conceived from 
common law trust principles, it was obvious to the Stevens camp that 
Congress actually intended ERISA to provide a broad frame under 
which the courts could apply make-whole compensatory relief.182 
Third, also written in the text of the statute are monetary dam-
ages for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(5), which should be 
 
 178. Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 179. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 n.5 (clarifying its decision in Varity Corp., 516 U.S. 
489, a breach of fiduciary duty case where the Court allowed reinstatement as appropriate eq-
uitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3)). 
 180. Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in N.Y., 392 F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Calhoon v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he statutory language does not 
condition available remedies on the defendant’s identity, but simply states that ‘a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary’ may bring a civil action ‘to obtain other appropriate equitable relief’ 
to enforce the act or the plan.” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3))). 
 181. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000). 
 182. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 496–97, 502–03. 
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applied to § 502(a)(3).183 After the Russell decision, the Court 
pointed out in Varity that § 502(l) of ERISA provides for payment 
of civil penalties by breaching fiduciaries to plan participants and 
beneficiaries (as well as to the plan) for claims brought under  
§ 502(a)(5), which language is nearly identical to § 502(a)(3).184 
The difference is that § 502(a)(5) only authorizes suits by the Secre-
tary of Labor, whereas § 502(a)(3) also includes suits by participants 
and beneficiaries.185 So, contrary to the Court’s prior Russell opinion, 
the Court held in Varity that ERISA does not preclude individual re-
covery for breach of fiduciary duty under  
§ 502(a)(3).186 
Fourth, as Justice Ginsburg has pointed out, the only decisions 
denying individual relief under § 502(a)(3) were against non-
fiduciaries.187 
And fifth, restitution, like that which the Scalia majority ruled as 
“appropriate” in both Mertens and Great-West, is a form of monetary 
relief in equity.188 Hence, there exists overwhelming support favoring 
monetary damages under § 502(a)(3) for individual plan beneficiar-
ies for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Most lower courts remain loyal to the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of “appropriate” equitable relief in Great-West, though some 
 
 183. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l). 
 184. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)). But see id. at 525 n.4 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that ERISA § 502(l) is not an indication that Congress 
intended individual relief under § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty because § 502(l) was 
enacted over a decade later); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260–61 (1993) (indi-
cating that ERISA § 502(l) penalties are only awarded when there has been a transfer to the 
plan of money or property). It should be noted that Varity was decided after Mertens, so the 
later ruling should stand. Mertens is based on a proposed regulation, Pension and Welfare 
Benefits Administration, 55 Fed. Reg. 25, 288–89 & n.9 (proposed June 20, 1990). Even if an 
agency’s proposed regulation held any weight, it should not after the Varity decision. And be-
cause § 502(l) is unambiguous in allowing for individual relief for a breach of fiduciary duty, 
the administrative proposal holds no weight. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a stat-
ute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
 185. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 510. 
 186. Id. at 510, 515. 
 187. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27–28 & 
n.13, Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)). 
 188. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 215 (2002); 
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251, 261–63. 
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were obedient somewhat reluctantly.189 For example, before Great-
West, the Second Circuit in Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. held that 
make-whole relief was appropriate as restitution for an alleged breach 
of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3).190 However, the Supreme 
Court’s Great-West dictum supposedly has added a new gloss to its 
meaning: restitution damages are available only in very limited cir-
cumstances.191 Accordingly, in the wake of that landmark decision, 
many lower courts, including the Second Circuit, have since rejected 
Strom and declined to extend common law trust remedies—such as 
restitution or any other legal remedies—to  
§ 502(a)(3).192 Those determined ineligible for benefits would have 
no claim to benefits that were never theirs.193 Indeed, the Second 
 
 189. Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Health-
care, 346 F.3d 442, 467 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The vital thing . . . is that either Congress or the 
Court act quickly, because the current situation is plainly untenable.”); Cicio v. Does, 321 
F.3d 83, 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the “gaping 
wound” caused by the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as inter-
preted by this Court, “will not be healed” until the Court either “start[s] over” or Congress 
“wipe[s] the slate clean”); see also McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 & n.2 
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the plaintiffs could not recover tax liabilities from lump sum payments because 
“Mertens precludes make-whole damages which are not equitable in nature,” regardless of 
whether the claims are against a fiduciary or non-fiduciary)); Hein v. F.D.I.C., 88 F.3d 210, 
223–24 (3d Cir. 1996); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 828–29 (10th Cir. 
1995); Fraser v. Lintas: Campbell-Ewald, 56 F.3d 722, 725 (6th Cir. 1995); Lee v. Burkhart, 
991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759–61 (8th 
Cir. 1992); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 654–60 (7th Cir. 1992); McRae v. Seafarers’ 
Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1991); Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan 
Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1462–64 (5th Cir. 1986); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. 
Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 190. 202 F.3d 138, 144–45, 150 (holding that, for a breach of fiduciary duty, restitution 
would be “equitable relief” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)); see also Bowerman 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 592 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff was 
entitled to the equitable remedy of restitution). 
 191. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214. 
 192. See, e.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 339–40 (2d Cir. 2005); Calhoon v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2005); Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392 
F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004); Kollman v. Hewitt Assocs., No. Civ.A.03–2944, 2005 WL 
1941658, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2005). Restitution is measured by a defendant’s unjust 
“gain, not on the plaintiff’s loss.” Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1(1), at 9 (West Publishing, Co. 1993) 
(1973)); see also Strom, 202 F.3d at 145 (“[B]reach of fiduciary duty . . . [is] a claim that al-
ways has been within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity and that never has required a showing 
of unjust enrichment.”). 
 193. See Kollman, 2005 WL 1941658, at *12 (citing Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211–14) 
(holding that front pay is not an acceptable form of equitable damages since it never belonged 
to the plaintiff). 
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Circuit summarized the lower courts’ reliance on the Great-West dic-
tum well: “Despite the sweep of the language from the Restatement 
supporting actions in equity against fiduciaries for breach of their du-
ties . . . I am persuaded that the Supreme Court’s dictum in Great-
West, sends a signal that should not be ignored.”194 Therefore, as it 
now stands, the majority of lower courts have not pursued Justice 
Ginsburg’s proposal for a fiduciary exception. 
Unlike the lower federal courts, the outcome of this tug-of-war 
in the Court over the scope of § 502(a)(3) will be a close finish,  fo-
cusing briefly on just numbers. In review, on one end, Justice Scalia 
is joined by Justice Thomas, adopting a narrow interpretation of 
“appropriate equitable remedies.”195 And on the other end, Justice 
Breyer and Justice Stevens maintain a broader definition based on 
trust principles.196 The other remaining Justices, such as the classic 
swing-voters Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, have played on 
both sides.197 Justice Stevens actually switched sides between the 
Russell and Mertens decisions.198 Also, Mertens and Great-West were 
both narrow wins (five-to-four) for the Scalia camp.199 Varity was a 
broader six-to-three victory for the Stevens camp.200 And Davila, 
though unanimous, never addressed the issue of remedies.201 With 
two new Justices joining the bench (Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Alito) to replace two middle-ground Justices (the former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor), the future of this issue is 
uncertain. 
V. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT FAVORS STEVENS 
Though the Court’s ultimate outcome in this tug-of-war over  
§ 502(a)(3) “equitable” relief may seem uncertain, one thing is 
plain: Justice Stevens’s camp clearly has a more appropriate ap-
proach. Justice Scalia’s textualist/originalist approach is simply too 
 
 194. Pereira, 413 F.3d at 346 (Newman, J., concurring). 
 195. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1993). 
 196. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496, 512, 515 (1996). 
 197. See id.; see also Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208; Mertens, 508 U.S. 248. 
 198. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., dissenting); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
 199. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 206; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 249. 
 200. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 491. 
 201. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
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myopic to encompass the true congressional intent.202 Justice Scalia 
would leave ERISA plans without any meaningful regulation of their 
eligibility decisions and plan participants without any meaningful 
remedies,203 especially given the fact that ERISA preempts any claims 
related to benefit plans.204 With no enforceable fiduciary duty to plan 
participants under ERISA, HMOs are not accountable for their inju-
rious actions. Surely, lawmakers would not intend such a result. Us-
ing Justice Stevens’s more suitable approach, courts should award 
ERISA plan participants at least make-whole compensatory damages 
for breach of fiduciary duty205 via Justice Ginsburg’s illusive loophole 
mentioned in Davila. First, ERISA expressly indicates one of its pri-
mary purposes: to impose duties on the plan fiduciaries to protect 
the individual plan participants and beneficiaries.206 Second, since 
ERISA was indisputably founded on common law trust principles,207 
it stands to reason that Congress intended the courts to apply those 
trust principles to ERISA claims, rather than Justice Scalia’s aban-
doned principles from the divided bench.208 Finally, with the more 
recent rise of HMOs to dominate the health care industry, ERISA’s 
far-reaching impact on something as complex as HMO liability was 
surely beyond anything Congress fathomed years prior upon the 
statute’s creation. For this reason, Justice Stevens’s make-whole ap-
proach may not actually be the best approach to HMO fiduciary li-
ability, but it is the only approach that would make sense under 
ERISA, as it now stands, to provide more feasible relief to injured 
 
 202. See Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 
75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10 (2004) (“With regard to statutes and the Constitution, the core 
commitment of Justice Scalia’s textualist originalist view is that judicial interpretation should 
aim to discern the ‘objective indication of the words’ as they would have been understood at 
the time of their enactment. This view is textualist because it takes statutory or constitutional 
text as the sole interpretive object, and it is originalist because it seeks to capture the under-
standing of the text at the time of enactment, as opposed to at the time of interpretation (or 
some other time).” (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION 3, 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1996))). Wherefore, Justice Scalia strayed 
from his own credo by adopting an interpretation of “equitable” that “would [not] have been 
understood at the time of [ERISA’s] enactment.” Id. 
 203. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57. 
 204. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
 205. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 223 (2002) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (finding no reason why Congress would deny such relief). 
 206. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
 207. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996). 
 208. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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plan participants. Therefore, it is evident that ERISA’s remedial 
scheme deserves further consideration by Congress, its creator—not 
further creativity in the courts. 
Section A will discuss one of Justice Stevens’s strongest justifica-
tions for interpreting § 502(a)(3) to provide compensatory relief to 
plan participants, which is to support the purposes Congress ex-
pressly included in the statute. Then, in light of ERISA’s express 
purposes, as well as its trust law foundation, Section B will consider § 
502(a)(3) application in the trust law context. Section C explains 
how Justice Scalia’s approach would in essence legitimize fraudulent 
HMO behavior. Section D describes ERISA’s impact on HMO li-
ability. 
A. Comprehensive Statutory Language of ERISA 
Like most laws, ERISA was not created in a vacuum. Courts have 
other sources to help shed light on that troublesome little phrase 
“other appropriate equitable relief.”209 The Supreme Court basically 
debated whether Congress intended to base ERISA § 502(a)(3) 
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty on trust law or on remedies 
available in equity during the practice of separate courts of law and 
of equity.210 Justice Stevens’s purposivist camp relied on the overall 
purposes behind ERISA to support the former theory,211 whereas 
Justice Scalia’s textualist camp supported the latter theory solely on a 
textual basis of one word in the statute: “equitable.”212 Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the Court in Varity, emphasized that “[w]e should 
expect that courts, in fashioning ‘appropriate’ equitable relief, will 
keep in mind the ‘special nature and purpose of employee benefit 
plans,’ and will respect the ‘policy choices reflected in the inclusion 
of certain remedies and the exclusion of others.’”213 Indeed, Justice 
Stevens did just that, finding ample support for his assertions not 
only in the text of the statute, but also in the legislative history. 
 
 209. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
 210. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 225–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993). 
 213. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987), and citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263–64, and Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)). 
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As already mentioned, ERISA itself indicates the statute was in-
tended to “provid[e] . . . appropriate remedies” to its participants.214 
The text of the statute contains the general purposes Congress in-
tended the statute to promote—namely, to protect the interests of 
participants and beneficiaries by (1) establishing fiduciary standards 
and (2) “providing for appropriate remedies” and “ready access to 
the Federal courts.”215 What is more, ERISA fiduciaries are expected 
to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”216 
Along with those direct statements, ERISA’s language also con-
tains more subtle indications that Congress intended to enforce fidu-
ciary obligations under ERISA. To begin with, comparing ERISA’s 
pension plan provisions to non-pension welfare benefit plan provi-
sions suggests the concern Congress had in fiduciary regulation of 
ERISA plan administration.217 ERISA covers both pension plans and 
non-pension welfare benefit plans, which include medical, surgical, 
accident, and health programs.218 As for pension plans, Title I of 
ERISA provides strict rules in such areas as funding, vesting, an anti-
cutback rule, plan termination insurance for the employer, and fidu-
ciary duties in managing the plan benefits.219 In contrast, Congress 
excluded welfare benefit plans from these Title I rules with the nota-
ble exception of fiduciary duty in managing the plan benefits—a 
strong indication of the import fiduciary law holds in welfare benefit 
plan administration.220 Another subtle example of fiduciary enforce-
ment is the aforementioned civil penalties in  
§ 502(l), awarded to the plan and to participants for breach of fidu-
ciary duty under §§ 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(5), which is nearly identi-
cal to § 502(a)(3).221 
Thus, even if the Court were to go strictly by the “comprehen-
sive” language of the statute, the Court would clearly reach the same 
result as Justice Stevens reached. Even the legislative history indi-
 
 214. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. § 1104(a)(1). 
 217. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1323. 
 218. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l). 
 219. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1322; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1). 
 220. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1323–24 (citing ERISA §§ 201(1), 301(a)(1), 
4021(a)(1)). 
 221. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510, 515 (1996); see also supra note 184 and 
accompanying text. 
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cated that Congress intended to provide broad remedies for breach 
of fiduciary duty.222 Indeed, “[g]iven these objectives, it is hard to 
imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches of fiduci-
ary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries 
a remedy.”223 
The Mertens majority, led by Justice Scalia, relied on a few other 
provisions of the statute to distinguish legal remedies from equitable 
remedies. For example, the placement together of both the terms 
“equitable” and “legal,” as well as “equitable” and “remedial,” in a 
few other provisions of the statute were distinguishing factors, ac-
cording to the majority’s opinion.224 Hence, according to the major-
ity, legal remedies cannot be considered equitable. From that, Justice 
Scalia inferred that § 502(a)(3) included only those remedies “typi-
cally available in equity” from the days of the divided bench.225 Not 
only has the divided bench been long-retired from the court system, 
but also, as the dissent pointed out, those provisions the majority re-
lied on made the distinction out of necessity because it had no trust 
law analogue to refer to.226 Hence, Justice Scalia missed the mark by 
narrowly deciphering the word “equity” in the wrong context with 
the rest of the statute—failing to consider those purposes Congress 
actually wrote into the text of the statute. 
 
 222. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 512 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), as re-
printed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (describing Senate version of enforcement provi-
sions as intended to “provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad 
remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]”), and citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-
533, at 17 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (describing Senate version 
in identical terms)). 
 223. Id. at 513. 
 224. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258–59 (1993). 
 225. Id. at 256–57. This system, which typically did not award legal or monetary dam-
ages in courts of equity, was abandoned in the 1930s. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 224 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “The rarified rules underlying 
this rigid and time-bound conception of the term ‘equity’ were hardly at the fingertips of those 
who enacted § 502(a)(3).” Id. “By 1974, when ERISA became law, the ‘days of the divided 
bench’ were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years earlier with the advent of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 224–25. 
 226. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 269–70 (White, J., dissenting). Although the majority 
claims it has such an analogue, id. at 259 n.9 (majority opinion), the dissent points out it is 
quite tenuous, at best. Id. at 269 n.3 (White, J., dissenting). 
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B. Trust Law Foundation 
Fiduciary duties have a well-established foundation in trust law. 
For instance, the fiduciary duties described in ERISA, such as duty of 
loyalty,227 duty of prudence,228 and benefit determinations,229 obvi-
ously parallel trust law language.230 And, in the HMO context, the 
Supreme Court looked at plan benefits as a “medical trust.”231 
Although there is little doubt that ERISA was originally derived 
from trust law principles,232 there is some question as to what extent 
trust law is reflected in ERISA.233 Yet, another look at the Court’s 
own case law, the legislative history, and even the statute itself clearly 
provide the answer: courts should use trust common law—which is 
settled and contemporary—as the template for deciding the scope of 
“appropriate equitable relief” rather than referring to Justice Scalia’s 
antiquated system. Put plainly in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, the Court stated that 
 
 227. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclu-
sive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”). 
 228. An ERISA fiduciary is to exercise “the care, skill, prudence, and diligence” of a 
“prudent man acting in a like capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering 
the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing 
with his own property.”). 
 229. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (requiring ERISA plans to follow written claims procedures for 
benefit denial, to give reasons for denials, and to provide for review of denials “by the appro-
priate named fiduciary”). 
 230. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1324–29; see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 
224 (2000) (“These responsibilities imposed by ERISA have the familiar ring of their source in 
the common law of trusts.”). 
 231. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004). 
 232. See, e.g., Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224. 
 233. “[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trus-
tees.” 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). In addition to the trustees, ERISA also provides that fiduciary du-
ties apply to any of those that administer the plan or exercise any discretion over the plan bene-
fits. Id. § 1002(21)(A). See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (“The 
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and 
skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property.”). But see 
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264–65 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “congress intended that the 
courts would look to the settled experience of the common law” to give shape to ERISA plans 
and “it is to the common law of trusts that we must look” to determine the correct scope of 
relief); Langbein, supra note 32, at 1324. 
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ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. 
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(7) (“participant”), 1002(8) (“benefi-
ciary”), 1002(21)(A) (“fiduciary”), 1103(a) (“trustee”), 1104 (“fi-
duciary duties”). ERISA’s legislative history confirms that the Act’s 
fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114, 
“codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain prin-
ciples developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.” Given this 
language and history, we have held that courts are to develop a 
“federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans.”234 
In Firestone, the Court applied trust law to fill in the blank for 
the appropriate standard of review for a denial of plan participants’ 
benefits, unanimously holding that de novo review was the appropri-
ate standard.235 As Professor Langbein indicated, “[t]he core fallacy 
of the majority opinion in Russell, which has carried over to Mertens 
and Great-West, is to confuse applying with implying.”236 In other 
words, Justice Scalia’s camp mistakenly inferred that Congress, by 
implication, intentionally omitted certain remedies from ERISA 
rather than applying the trust law principles to fashion “appropriate 
equitable remedies,” as Congress intended. For instance, the ERISA 
§ 404(a) fiduciary duty description and the § 502(a)(3) “catchall” 
remedy provision were only generally described.237 And, as Professor 
Langbein pointed out, Congress also left out a statute of limitations, 
a jury trial requirement, a standard of review, when attorney fees are 
 
 234. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (citing Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (em-
phasis added); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 
n.26 (1983) (“[A] body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with 
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.” (quoting 120 
CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits))). “ERISA’s legislative history confirms 
that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114, ‘codif[y] and 
mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the 
law of trusts.’” Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), as 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649). 
 235. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 115. 
 236. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1343. “Accordingly, interpreting Congress’s term ‘ap-
propriate equitable relief’ to cover so predictable and recurrent a case as fiduciary breach result-
ing in consequential injury entails applying the cause of action Congress created, not implying 
a cause of action that Congress omitted.” Id. at 1344. 
 237. Id. The Court referred to ERISA §§ 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(5) as “catchall” provi-
sions. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (“This structure suggests that these 
‘catchall’ provisions act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused 
by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.”). 
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appropriate, and whether punitive damages are permissible.238 In-
deed, “when enacting ERISA Congress was transposing the trust 
model into regulatory law for the newly federalized field of pension 
and employee benefit plans.”239 
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly indicated in the statute, 
common law trust principles should apply by default to develop “ap-
propriate equitable relief” for breaches of fiduciary duty, just as Jus-
tice Ginsburg suggested in Davila.240 Trust law traditionally provides 
make-whole relief in various instances, such as for “[a]cts of ‘negli-
gence or misconduct in the making or retaining of investments.’”241 
It stands to reason that such a remedy could apply to ERISA fiduci-
ary liability cases. Justice Scalia even stated that the meaning of § 
502(a)(3) relief “remains a question of interpretation in each case 
which meaning is intended.”242 The make-whole standard, a “core 
principle of trust remedy law, . . . restores the victim to the positions 
that he or she would have had ‘if there had been no breach of 
trust.’”243 Trust law allows for specific performance and restitution, 
as well as monetary damages.244 In fact, the Uniform Trust Code 
provides that “[t]o remedy a breach of trust . . . the court may . . . 
compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying money.”245 
“The trust remedy tradition grew up in equity and remains, in the 
 
 238. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1345. The courts have addressed some of these issues 
and “filled in the blanks.” See, e.g., Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108–09 (stating that “federal courts 
have adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard” of review); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (holding that fiduciaries are not liable for punitive 
damages). 
 239. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1343–44. 
 240. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264–65 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) 
(citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110). 
 241. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1337 (quoting GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. 
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862, at 38 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)). Langbein re-
fers to one such example of trust law application in an executor’s administration of a probate 
estate. Id. (citing In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 298 (N.Y. 1977)). 
 242. Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 256–57. 
 243. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1335 (quoting 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & 
WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)). 
 244. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) (“[A] 
plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an eq-
uitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plain-
tiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (1936); 3 DOBBS, supra note 192, at 587–
88; GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4, at 17, § 3.7, at 262 (1978))). 
 245. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 221 (Supp. 2003). 
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words of the Restatement of Trusts, ‘exclusively equitable.’”246 And, 
“there is no reason to suspect that Congress intended to base ERISA 
on the law of trusts while omitting the predicate law’s core rem-
edy.”247 Thus, trust law does include compensatory damages as an 
available equitable remedy. 
Nevertheless, ignoring those aspects of the trust remedy law as 
“other appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA,248 Justice Scalia’s 
overly-restrictive “categories of relief that were typically available in 
equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not com-
pensatory damages)”249 effectively provide no relief at all to most vic-
tims wrongfully denied or delayed benefits by HMOs. And a “crime” 
(in this case, a cause of action) with no punishment, is no crime at 
all, as explained in the following section. 
C. Negative Effects of HMOs’ ERISA Shield 
Including a cause of action in ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty 
that preempts state law claims yet denies individual compensatory re-
lief creates a vehicle for HMOs to defraud. With no enforceable li-
ability outside of injunction and restitution, the denial of individual 
relief provides further incentive for HMOs to deny or short-change 
medical coverage to ERISA plan participants, legitimizing what may 
seem to some people an already common HMO practice. Indeed, 
one of the foremost reasons for which Justice Scalia’s approach is en-
ticing to HMOs is the liability shield ERISA provides them. Partici-
pants in the midst of medical crises are generally in no position to 
appeal their beneficiary rights. And with only “equitable” remedies 
under ERISA, as interpreted by the courts, the most that could hap-
pen is the HMO would be forced to cover only the medical treat-
ment in question and not any resulting harm from the HMO’s deci-
sion to deny the physician’s prescribed medical treatment. By then, 
the plaintiff is often seeking damages, not coverage, which are sup-
posedly unavailable under ERISA’s § 502(a) civil enforcement provi-
sions. Thus, one could say an HMO may literally get away with 
murder. 
 
 246. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1320 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
197 (1959)). 
 247. DiFelice v. AETNA U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 466 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 248. See ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000). 
 249. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
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One is left to wonder why Justice Scalia would thus limit “other 
appropriate equitable relief”—especially since most claims seeking 
payment to the plaintiff, whether by judgment, declaration, or in-
junction, are “[a]lmost invariably” for loss caused by defendant’s 
breach of fiduciary duty or legal damages.250 All that remains of 
“typically equitable” remedies after Great-West is “(1) injunction, for 
which Congress did not need to provide ‘other appropriate equitable 
relief’ in [§] 502(a)(3), having already expressly authorized injunc-
tion earlier in the same sentence; and (2) restitution for cases that 
might have been brought as constructive trust actions before fu-
sion.”251 Indeed, Professor Langbein was puzzled at why the drafters 
would hide the ball by calling it “other appropriate equitable relief” 
if what they had really intended was just a constructive trust.252 
Justice Scalia’s response was that § 502(a) was intended to pro-
tect the plan, not the plan beneficiaries.253 His reasoning referred 
back to Justice Stevens’s concept of a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme in his Russell decision.254 Since §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) were 
the only places that expressly addressed breaches of fiduciary duty, 
that was the only way Congress intended the courts to allow recov-
ery for a breach of fiduciary duty.255 And, from the Russell decision, 
those sections will not provide individual relief for breaches of fiduci-
ary duty.256 In addition, in a further effort to protect plan assets, Jus-
tice Scalia rejected the application of current trust law principles as 
too expansive (and perhaps expensive).257 He explained that Con-
gress must have meant to limit the relief available by using the word 
“equitable,” “[s]ince all relief available for breach of trust could be 
obtained from a court of equity.”258 With nothing else to turn to—
no legislative history, no case law, not even the trust law ERISA was 
 
 250. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 918–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 251. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1360. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 522–25 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 254. See id. 
 255. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 n.5 (2002). 
 256. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–58 (1993). 
 257. Id. at 256–58, 262. 
 258. See id. However, it is worth noting that restitution, like that upheld in Mertens, is 
based in trust law, further implicating the weakness of his stance against the application of trust 
law. Id. at 256. In Great-West, Justice Scalia tried to cover his oversight by distinguishing resti-
tution in equity from that in law. 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 
754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
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based on—Justice Scalia unearthed ancient principles from the obso-
lete practice of a divided bench to reach a narrow definition of “eq-
uitable” that would favor protection to ERISA plans.259 In effect, 
Justice Scalia’s strict textual approach was actually more of a 
stretch—rejecting the “vague notion” of protecting plan beneficiaries 
for protection of the plan assets themselves.260 In opposition to Jus-
tice Scalia’s baseless inferences, Justice Ginsberg stated appropriately, 
The Court is no doubt correct that “vague notions of a statute’s 
‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome the words of its 
text regarding the specific issue under consideration.” But when 
Congress’ clearly stated purpose so starkly conflicts with question-
able inferences drawn from a single word in the statute, it is the lat-
ter, and not the former, that must give way.261 
With the recent emergence of HMOs, the vast intricacies of 
HMO administration, and the fact that the stakes are much higher 
when dealing with people’s health than with their retirement funds, 
perhaps HMOs should be held to a different fiduciary standard than 
ordinary ERISA fiduciaries. Thus, ERISA’s application to HMO 
plans deserves a closer look. 
D. HMO Considerations 
Despite Justice Scalia’s questionable justification supporting his 
narrow definition of equity, his theory may have some redeeming 
qualities in the context of emerging HMO liability. An argument 
could be made that shifting focus of fiduciary duty of loyalty from 
the plan to individual plan beneficiaries would inevitably lead to 
costly consequences and confusion. Justice Scalia has even men-
tioned that increasing liability may induce higher costs, discouraging 
employers from offering private benefit plans.262 Furthermore, as il-
lustrated by the amicus curiae brief cited in Varity, plan administra-
 
 259. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–58. 
 260. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 538–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Al-
though Congress sought to guarantee that employees receive the welfare benefits promised by 
employers, Congress was also aware that if the cost of providing welfare benefits rose too high, 
employers would not provide them at all.”); see also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (“Exposure to 
that sort of liability would impose high insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with 
and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves.”). 
 261. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 227–28 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261). 
 262. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 538–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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tive decisions will favor payment to the beneficiaries over preserving 
plan assets, thereby hiking costs for ERISA plans.263 Non-expert 
courts may place plan administrators’ “technical decisions” under the 
microscope for closer supervision,264 and plaintiffs may cloak their 
ordinary benefit claims as fiduciary duty claims.265 Thus, some legal 
authorities, including Justice Scalia, reason that Congress must have 
intended this restrictive remedial scheme for ERISA HMO plans. 
Still, this is all speculative, especially in the HMO context. In 
fact, none of these arguments were made in terms of HMOs and the 
climbing medical costs that burden this country today. Without any 
support of this theory precipitated anywhere, such as in the legisla-
tive history, it does not explain how Congress intended to apply 
ERISA’s § 502 remedial scheme in HMO liability claims relating to 
employee benefit plans. Because HMOs, in the form they exist to-
day, did not dominate the health care industry at the time ERISA 
was created, Congress could not have anticipated the extent of the 
effects of HMO liability under ERISA benefit plan regulation. What 
ERISA’s legislative history does demonstrate is that Congress in-
tended to word the statute broadly (“other appropriate equitable re-
lief”) in order to provide flexibility in employment benefit plan regu-
lation, thereby leaving the federal courts to “fine-tune ERISA’s 
remedial scheme” based on trust common law tradition.266 Or, as 
Professor Langbein summarized Justice Stevens’s approach, 
To expect express statutory regulation in ERISA concerning such 
details of sound fiduciary practice misconceives how Congress con-
structed ERISA. What Congress did in ERISA was (1) to mandate 
the trust device for all plan assets; (2) to make every person an 
ERISA fiduciary who exercises any discretion over plan assets or 
plan administration; and (3) to prescribe the core principles of trust 
fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence, to govern all aspects of plan 
 
 263. Id. at 514 (majority opinion). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 513–14. 
 266. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 n.6, 155, 157 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citing several references in the legislative history indicating a clear 
intent to extend trust fiduciary principles to employee benefit plans). For example, Senator 
Jacob Javits, one of the principle authors of ERISA, reported to the Senate Committee on La-
bor and Public Welfare that “[i]t is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be 
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private wel-
fare and pension plans.” Id. at 156 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of 
Sen. Javits)). But see supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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administration. In consequence, Congress had no need to spell out 
the details, and considerable reason not to do so when legislating 
for a new field whose contours were not yet fully known.267 
Though Justice Stevens’s camp has the more fitting approach for 
ERISA plan management, the application of Justice Stevens’s inter-
pretation of “other appropriate equitable relief” is simply not enough 
in this context. The HMO liability problem is much bigger than 
could be adequately covered by ERISA as it now stands. To begin 
with, lumping HMOs into ERISA regulation has resulted in a regu-
latory vacuum that needs to be addressed by either Congress or the 
Court. Injured plan participants have no effective relief under Justice 
Scalia’s approach to ERISA’s remedial scheme. Along with plan par-
ticipants’ lack of effective relief are complex cost issues, such as how 
to balance the costs of providing benefits to plan participants, as Jus-
tice Stevens would suggest, while avoiding higher plan costs that 
may result from increased HMO liability, as Justice Scalia would 
suggest. Also, as demonstrated by the Pegram and Davila cases, 
ERISA fiduciary duty is not always very black and white in HMO 
benefit administration.268 Eligibility decisions are inescapably steeped 
in medical treatment considerations, implying a more complex set of 
standards than ERISA’s “comprehensive and reticulated” scheme 
envisioned. 
Thus, in response to the “regulatory vacuum” that has resulted 
and to the recent rise of HMOs, Congress needs to reconsider § 
502(a)’s application in the context of HMOs that breach their fidu-
ciary duty.269 Meanwhile, courts should apply trust law principles to 
effectuate ERISA’s intent of protecting plan participants. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Had Juan Davila actually claimed § 502(a)(3) remedies for 
breach of fiduciary duty, instead of limiting himself to appealing the 
lower court’s decision for ERISA preemption of his state law claims, 
 
 267. Langbein, supra note 32, at 1328–29 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 268. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220–21 (2004); Pegram v. Herdrich, 
530 U.S. 211, 235–36 (2000). “[W]hen an HMO guarantees medically necessary care, deter-
minations of coverage in an emergency situation ‘cannot be untangled from physicians’ judg-
ments about reasonable medical treatment.’” Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 
355, 383 (2002) (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229). 
 269. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. AETNA 
U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
JOHNSON.MRO.DOC 2/6/2007 11:49:20 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1628 
the viability of Justice Ginsburg’s loophole would no longer remain a 
mystery. Thus far, lower federal courts generally do not grant com-
pensatory relief after the Supreme Court’s Mertens decision. Not-
withstanding, the Court is actually split over the matter. If the Court 
were to rule in accordance with the purposes ERISA was intended to 
fulfill—to protect plan participants—the success of his claim would 
be certain. 
According to Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach, ERISA was 
enacted to protect the employee plan beneficiaries, based on the idea 
that the plan benefits are being held in trust, and to provide uni-
formity in the regulation of employee pension and welfare benefits 
plans. As such, Congress based much of ERISA on common law 
trust principles. But with this being a new area of law, it only pro-
vided a basic structure, with the expectation that the courts would 
use trust common law to develop their own “federal common law” 
for ERISA.270 On the other hand, the textualists on the Court be-
lieved that ERISA has a “comprehensive” remedial scheme that 
should be applied only to protect the plan itself, not the employee 
participants. From that, they inferred § 502(a)(3)’s “other appropri-
ate equitable relief” to exclude compensatory damages.271 
Although perhaps Justice Scalia had worthy intentions of con-
trolling increased costs that may arise from allowing individual relief 
under § 502(a)(3) for breaches of fiduciary duty, Congress did not 
share the same sentiment. In fact, with very tenuous support for his 
position, he rejected ample legislative history, case law, trust law 
principles, and even express relevant text of ERISA that overwhelm-
ingly supported the application of make-whole compensatory reme-
dies as “appropriate equitable relief.” In fact, what Justice Scalia said 
is that ERISA provides a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty 
 
 270. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157–58 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I believe that, in resolving 
this and other questions concerning appropriate relief under ERISA, courts should begin by 
ascertaining the extent to which trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts 
provide for recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits that have been withheld; 
this is the logical first step, given that Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s 
equitable remedies. If a requested form of additional relief is available under state trust law, 
courts should next consider whether allowance of such relief would significantly conflict with 
some other aspect of the ERISA scheme. In addition, courts must always bear in mind the ul-
timate consideration whether allowance or disallowance of particular relief would best effectu-
ate the underlying purposes of ERISA—enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the 
administration of all aspects of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants 
and beneficiaries.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 271. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
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and even has exclusive jurisdiction of related claims, but his narrow 
interpretation of § 502(a)(3) provides no compensatory relief to 
those injured individual plaintiffs. Of course, this sort of “immunity” 
encourages HMOs to deny coverage to plan participants. 
The reality is that although Justice Stevens’s trust law approach is 
clearly the most appropriate approach under ERISA as it now stands, 
it is evidently not the best approach to HMO liability. HMOs did 
not exist in their present form at the time of ERISA’s conception. 
Consequently, the HMO problem simply has too many pieces than 
can fit into the ERISA mold Congress has provided. Therefore, 
though the Court is now caught in a tug-of-war, with very polarized 
views of how to approach the problem, there is no question that 
what HMO liability needs is not judicial creativity, but careful con-
gressional consideration and action.  
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